Hayek, Local Information, and Commanding Heights: Decentralizing State-Owned Enterprises in China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Huang, Zhangkai; Li, Lixing; Ma, Guangrong; Xu, Lixin Colin
• 署名单位: Tsinghua University; Peking University; Renmin University of China; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150592
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2455-2478
• 关键词: MARKET SOCIALISM; COMMUNICATION; CORRUPTION; firm; COORDINATION; ORGANIZATION; TECHNOLOGY; governance; TRANSITION; OWNERSHIP

摘要

Hayek (1945) argues that local information is key to understanding the efficiency of alternative economic systems and whether production should be centralized or decentralized. The Chinese experience of decentralizing SOEs confirms this insight: when the distance to the government is farther, the SOE is more likely to be decentralized, and this distance-decentralization link is more pronounced with higher communication costs and greater firm-performance heterogeneity. However, when the Chinese central government oversees SOEs in strategic industries, the distance-decentralization link is muted. We also consider alternative agency-cost-based explanations, and do not find much support. (JEL D22, D83, L25, L32, L33, O14, P31)