Impatience versus Incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Opp, Marcus M.; Zhu, John Y.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11473
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1601-1617
• 关键词: Firm Dynamics; Credit cycles; EXPROPRIATION; INVESTMENT; CONTRACTS; liquidity; debt; RISK

摘要

This paper studies the dynamics of long-term contracts in repeated principal-agent relationships with an impatient agent. Despite the absence of exogenous uncertainty, Pareto-optimal dynamic contracts generically oscillate between favoring the principal and favoring the agent.