CONTRACT NEGOTIATION AND THE COASE CONJECTURE: A STRATEGIC FOUNDATION FOR RENEGOTIATION-PROOF CONTRACTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Strulovici, Bruno
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13637
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 585-616
• 关键词: Repeated games; conflicting interests; equilibrium selection; perfect equilibrium; reputation; monopoly; INFORMATION; VALUES; MODEL; time

摘要

What does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible? This paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts in this environment. The model extends the framework of the Coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods. As frictions become negligible, all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating, efficient, and straightforward to characterize.