Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India's Direct Benefit Transfer Policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barnwal, Prabhat
• 署名单位: Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161864
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3812-3846
• 关键词: tax evasion; DISTRIBUTION-SYSTEM; FUEL SUBSIDIES; Take-up; ENFORCEMENT; CORRUPTION; IMPACT; adoption; REFORM; LPG

摘要

Targeted price subsidies create a gap between subsidized and unsub- sidized prices. The resulting dual pricing can lead to arbitrage oppor- tunities where intermediaries divert subsidized goods to unintended beneficiaries via the black market. I study India's Direct Benefit Transfer policy for cooking fuel subsidies, , which altered the existing subsidy program by transferring subsidies directly to beneficiaries' bank accounts. The policy decreased subsidized fuel purchases, , indi- cating a reduction in diversion to the black market. Changes in unsub- sidized fuel sales and black market prices provide supporting evidence that leakage was reduced. These results suggest that addressing the underlying perverse incentives in welfare delivery can improve effi- ciency by curbing leakages. ( JEL D73, I38, O17, Q41, Q48) )