Beliefs in Repeated Games: An ExperimentIndian Rupee

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aoyagi, Masaki; Frechette, Guillaume r.; Yuksel, Sevgi
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220639
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3944-3975
• 关键词: infinitely repeated games; NORMAL-FORM GAMES; players models; stated beliefs; COOPERATION; BEHAVIOR; dilemma; elicitation; preferences; INFORMATION

摘要

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' elicited beliefs about the other player's action are generally accurate despite some systematic deviations, and anticipate the evolution of behavior differently between the finite and indefinite games. We also use the elicited beliefs over actions to recover beliefs over supergame strategies played by the other player. We find these beliefs over strategies correctly capture the different classes of strategies played in each game, vary substantially across subjects, and rationalize their strategies.