Does the Squeaky Wheel Get More Grease? The Direct and Indirect Effects of Citizen Participation on Environmental Governance in Chinat

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Buntaine, Mark T.; Greenstone, Michael; He, Guojun; Liu, Mengdi; Wang, Shaoda; Zhang, Bing
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Hong Kong; University of International Business & Economics; Nanjing University of Finance & Economics; Nanjing University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221215
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 815-850
• 关键词: clean-air act; field experiment; water-pollution; protest; IMPACT; TRANSPARENCY; regulations; exposure; BORDERS; QUALITY

摘要

We conducted a nationwide field experiment in China to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of assigning firms to public or private citizen appeals when they violate pollution standards. There are three main findings. First, public appeals to the regulator through social media substantially reduce violations and pollution emissions, while private appeals cause more modest environmental improvements. Second, public appeals appear to tilt regulators' focus away from facilitating economic growth and toward avoiding pollution-induced public unrest. Third, pollution reductions by treated firms are not offset by control firms, based on randomly varying the proportion of treated firms at the prefecture level. (JEL D22, L82, P28, P31, Q52,