Trading Networks With Frictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fleiner, Tamas; Jagadeesan, Ravi; Janko, Zsuzsanna; Teytelboym, Alexander
• 署名单位: Budapest University of Technology & Economics; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Institute of Economics - HAS; Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Harvard University; Harvard University; University of Hamburg; Corvinus University Budapest; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14159
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1633-1661
• 关键词: Stable matchings; STABILITY; equilibrium

摘要

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes and commissions. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive equilibria exist and coincide with outcomes that satisfy a cooperative solution concept called trail stability. However, competitive equilibria are generally neither stable nor Pareto-efficient.