Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.202304782553
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2553-2595
• 关键词: Adverse selection; privacy; MARKET; monopoly

摘要

A monopolist platform uses data to match heterogeneous consumers with multiproduct sellers. The consumers can purchase the products on the platform or search off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their match values. The revenue-optimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences efficiently. In equilibrium,sellers offer higher qualities at lower unit prices on than off plat-form. The platform exploits its information advantage to increase its bargaining power vis-a-vis the sellers. Finally, privacy-respecting data-governance rules can lead to welfare gains for consumers.