Preferences for Truth-Telling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abeler, Johannes; Nosenzo, Daniele; Raymond, Collin
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Nottingham; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14673
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1115-1153
• 关键词: honesty; dishonesty; lies; COMMUNICATION; promises; games; institutions; perceptions; incentives; conformity

摘要

Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics, psychology, and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models, and conduct new experiments to do so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth-telling.