The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De La Sierra, Raul Sanchez; Titeca, Kristof; Xie, Haoyang (Stan ); Lameke, Aimable amani; Malukisa, A. L. B. E. R. T. JoLINo
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Antwerp
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220908
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3976-4014
• 关键词: SPEED ENFORCEMENT; CORRUPTION; irrigation; BUSINESS; drivers

摘要

This paper provides insight into a corruption scheme in Kinshasa's traffic police agency. First, various data collection branches show that the agency's revenue is five times that from fines and is derived from a coalition of traffic police officials, their managers, and judicial police officers scheming to extort drivers. Second, the analysis of an experiment suggests that the scheme subverts service. Third, the scheme appears to be a rational response to the context, but its logic is widespread. The findings suggest that coalitions of officials, while being socially costly, can yield large illicit revenue, nuancing the notion of state weakness. ( JEL D73, H76, K42, O17)