Mental Models and Learning: The Case of Base-Rate Neglects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Esponda, Ignacio; Vespa, Emanuel; Yuksel, Sevgi
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201004
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: HYPOTHETICAL THINKING; revealed preference; INFORMATION; expectations; equilibrium; frictions; selection; JUDGMENT; BEHAVIOR; play

摘要

We experimentally document persistence of suboptimal behavior despite ample opportunities to learn from feedback in a canonical updating problem where people suffer from base -rate neglect. Our results provide insights on the mechanisms hindering learning from feedback. Importantly, our results suggest mistakes are more likely to be persistent when they are driven by incorrect mental models that miss or misrepresent important aspects of the environment. Such models induce confidence in initial answers, limiting engagement with and learning from feedback. We substantiate these insights in an alternative scenario where individuals involved in a voting problem overlook the importance of being pivotal. (JEL D83, D91)