Hub-and-Spoke Cartels: Theory and Evidence from the Grocery Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clark, Robert; Horstmann, Ig; Houde, Jean-Francois
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada; University of Toronto; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211337
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 783-814
• 关键词: resale price maintenance; slotting allowances; collusion; COMPETITION; retailers; COMMUNICATION; manufacturers; CONTRACTS; ECONOMICS; inference

摘要

Numerous recently uncovered cartels operated along the supply chain, with firms at one end facilitating collusion at the otherhub -and -spoke arrangements. These cartels are hard to rationalize because they induce double marginalization and higher costs. We examine Canada's alleged bread cartel and provide the first comprehensive analysis of hub -and -spoke collusion. Using court documents and pricing data, we make three contributions: (i) we show that collusion was effective, increasing inflation by about 50 percent; (ii) we provide evidence that collusion existed at both ends of the supply chain; and (iii) we develop a model explaining why this form of collusion arose. (JEL E31, K21, L12, L14, L22, L42, L81)