Polity Size and Local Government Performance: Evidence from India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Narasimhan, Veda; Weaver, Jeffrey
• 署名单位: New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221712
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3385-3426
• 关键词: PROVISION EVIDENCE; DEMOCRACY EVIDENCE; field experiment; public-goods; decentralization; ACCOUNTABILITY; responsiveness; TECHNOLOGY; sanitation; governance

摘要

Developing countries have increasingly decentralized power to local governments. This paper studies the implications of a central element of decentralization (polity size) using population-based discontinuities that determine local government boundaries for over 100,000 Indian villages. Over the short and long run, individuals allocated into local governments with smaller populations have better access to public goods. We provide suggestive evidence that these results are related to heightened civic engagement and stronger political incentives, but not to other mechanisms such as elite capture. ( JEL D72, H41, H75, H76, O17, O18, R50)