Bank Runs , Fragility , and Credit Easing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amador, Manuel; Bianchi, Javier
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220328
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2073-2110
• 关键词: macroeconomic model; financial crises; monetary-policy; debt; liquidity; RISK; INVESTMENT; panics; COSTS; equilibrium

摘要

We present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs , where banks trade capital in competitive and liquid markets but remain vulnerable to runs due to a loss of creditor confidence. We characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on its leverage position and the economy-wide asset prices. We study the effect of credit easing policies , in the form of asset purchases. When a banking crisis is generated by runs , credit easing can reduce the number of defaulting banks and enhance welfare. When the crisis is driven by fundamentals , credit easing may have adverse consequences. ( JEL E32, E44, E58, G01, G21, G28, G33 )