Buying from a Group

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haghpanah, Nima; Kuvalekar, Aditya; Lipnowski, Elliot
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Essex; Yale University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230914
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2596-2632
• 关键词: mechanisms; EFFICIENCY

摘要

A buyer procures a good owned by a group of sellers whose heterogeneous cost of trade is private information. The buyer must either buy the whole good or nothing , , and sellers share the transfer in proportion to their share of the good. We characterize the optimal mechanism: trade occurs if and only if the buyer's benefit of trade exceeds a weighted average of sellers' virtual costs. These weights are endogenous , , with sellers who are ex ante less inclined to trade receiving higher weight. This mechanism always outperforms posted-price mechanisms. An extension characterizes the entire Pareto frontier.