Personalized Pricing and Competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rhodes, Andrew; Zhou, Jidong
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Yale University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221524
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2141-2170
• 关键词: imperfect competition; DISCRIMINATION; INFORMATION; COSTS

摘要

We study personalized pricing in a general oligopoly model. The impact of personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing hinges on the degree of market coverage. If market conditions are such that coverage is high ( e.g. , the production cost is low or the number of firms is high ) , personalized pricing harms firms and benefits consumers , whereas the opposite is true if coverage is low. When only some firms have data to personalize prices , consumers can be worse off compared to when either all or no firms personalize prices. ( JEL D21, D43, D82 )