Crowding in School Choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Phan, William; Tierney, Ryan; Zhou, Yu
• 署名单位: North Carolina State University; University of Southern Denmark; Nagoya University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220626
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2526-2552
• 关键词: ONE MATCHING MARKETS; stable matchings; STABILITY; preferences; externalities; allocation; residents; auction; demand; DESIGN

摘要

We consider the market design problem of matching students to schools in the presence of crowding effects. These effects are salient in parents' decision-making and the empirical literature; however, , they cause difficulties in the design of satisfactory mechanisms and, , as such, , are not currently considered. We propose a new framework and an equilibrium notion that accommodates crowding, , no-envy, , and respect for priorities. The equilibrium has a student-optimal element that induces an incentive-compatible mechanism and is implementable via a novel algorithm. Moreover, , analogs of fundamental structural results of the matching literature ( the rural hospitals theorem, , welfare lattice, , etc.) ) survive. ( JEL D47, H75, I21, I28)