Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ergin, Haluk; Sonmez, Tayfun; Unver, M. Utku
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston College
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16400
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 965-1005
• 关键词: PAIRED-EXCHANGE; LIVING DONORS; school choice; transplantation; RISK; assignment; STABILITY; auction; grafts; MARKET

摘要

Liver exchange has been practiced in small numbers, mainly to overcome blood-type incompatibility between patients and their living donors. A donor can donate either his smaller left lobe or the larger right lobe, although the former option is safer. Despite its elevated risk, right-lobe transplantation is often utilized due to size-compatibility requirement with the patient. We model liver exchange as a market-design problem, focusing on logistically simpler two-way exchanges, and introduce an individually rational, Pareto-efficient, and incentive-compatible mechanism. Construction of this mechanism requires novel technical tools regarding bilateral exchanges under partial-order-induced preferences. Through simulations we show that not only can liver exchange increase the number of transplants by more than 30%, it can also increase the share of the safer left-lobe transplants.