Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lipnowski, Elliot; Ravid, Doron
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA15674
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1631-1660
• 关键词: information; games

摘要

We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: The sender's preferences are state independent. Our main observation is that such a sender gains credibility by degrading self-serving information. Using this observation, we examine the sender's benefits from communication, assess the value of commitment, and explicitly solve for sender-optimal equilibria in three examples. A key result is a geometric characterization of the value of cheap talk, described by thequasiconcave envelope of the sender's value function.