Leaders in Social Movements: Evidence from Unions in Myanmar

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boudreau, Laura; Macchiavello, Rocco; Minni, Virginia; Tanaka, Mari
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Hitotsubashi University; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230758
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1975-2000
• 关键词: inference; personality; selection; example; games

摘要

Social movements are catalysts for crucial institutional changes. To succeed, they must coordinate members' views (consensus building) and actions (mobilization). We study union leaders within Myanmar's burgeoning labor movement. Union leaders are positively selected on both ability and personality traits that enable them to influence others, yet they earn lower wages. In group discussions about workers'views on an upcoming national minimum wage negotiation, randomly embedded leaders build consensus around the union's preferred policy. In an experiment that mimics individual decision-making in a collective action setup, leaders increase mobilization through coordination. (JEL D91, J38, J51, O15)