NONLINEAR TAX INCIDENCE AND OPTIMAL TAXATION IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sachs, Dominik; Tsyvinski, Aleh; Werquin, Nicolas
• 署名单位: University of Munich; Yale University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14681
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 469-493
• 关键词: comparative advantage; INEQUALITY; IMPACT; elasticities; POLICY

摘要

We study the incidence of nonlinear labor income taxes in an economy with a continuum of endogenous wages. We derive in closed form the effects of reforming non-linearly an arbitrary tax system, by showing that this problem can be formalized as an integral equation. Our tax incidence formulas are valid both when the underlying assignment of skills to tasks is fixed or endogenous. We show qualitatively and quantitatively that contrary to conventional wisdom, if the tax system is initially suboptimal and progressive, the general-equilibrium trickle-down forces may raise the benefits of increasing the marginal tax rates on high incomes. We finally derive a parsimonious characterization of optimal taxes.