Mortgage Pricing and Monetary Policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benetton, Matteo; Gavazza, Alessandro; Surico, Paolo
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 823-863
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; MARKET; COMPETITION; DISCRIMINATION; service; demand; pass

摘要

This paper examines how central bank policies influence mortgage pricing in the United Kingdom. It shows that lenders price discriminate by offering two-part tariffs of interest rates and origination fees, and during unconventional monetary policies like the Funding for Lending Scheme, lenders reduced interest rates while increasing fees. Using a model of mortgage demand and lender competition, we find that central bank policies increased mortgage lending. Additionally, banning origination fees would reduce lending, as fees help lenders capture surplus while allowing them to price discriminate across borrowers with different sensitivities to rates and fees. (JEL E43, E52, E58, G21, G28, R31)