Test-Optional Admissions†

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dessein, Wouter; Frankel, Alex; Kartik, Navin
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Chicago; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231407
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 3130-3170
• 关键词: college; enrollment; disclosure

摘要

Many US colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say, with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that society dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its disagreement cost. We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society. (JEL I23, I28)