The Decline of Too Big to Fail

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berndt, Antje; Duffie, Darrell; Zhu, Yichao
• 署名单位: Australian National University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220846
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 945-974
• 关键词: capital structure; moral hazard; MARKET DISCIPLINE; corporate-debt; BANK BAILOUTS; RISK; maturity; SPREAD; MODEL

摘要

For globally systemically important banks (GSIBs) with US headquarters, we find significant reductions in market-implied probabilities of government bailout after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), along with roughly 170 percent higher wholesale debt financing costs for these banks after controlling for insolvency risk. Since the GFC, bank creditors appear to expect much larger losses in the event that a GSIB approaches insolvency. In this sense, we estimate a decline of too big to fail. (G01, G12, G21, G28, G33, H81)