When Do Nudges Increase Welfare?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Allcott, Hunt; Cohen, Daniel; Morrison, William; Taubinsky, Dmitry
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; Cornerstone Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231304
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1555-1596
• 关键词: sugar-sweetened beverages; pass-through; social norms; fuel-economy; Take-up; tax; INFORMATION; COSTS; taxation; prices

摘要

We use public finance sufficient statistic approaches to characterize the welfare effects of nudges, such as simplified information and warning labels, in markets with taxes and endogenous prices. While many studies focus on average effects, we show that welfare also depends on how the nudge affects the variance of choice distortions, and average effects become irrelevant with zero pass-through or optimal taxes. We implement the framework with experiments evaluating automotive fuel economy labels and sugary drink health labels. Labels decrease purchases of low-fuel economy cars and sugary drinks but may decrease welfare because they increase the variance of choice distortions. (JEL D18, D62, D83, D91, H21, L62, L66)