Historical Self-Governance and Norms of Cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rustagi, Devesh
• 署名单位: University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20579
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1473-1502
• 关键词: public-goods; Conditional cooperation; economic-development; collective action; STATE-CAPACITY; institutions; EVOLUTION; DYNAMICS; CONSEQUENCES; transmission

摘要

Does self-governance, a hallmark of democratic societies, foster norms of generalized cooperation? Does this effect persist, and if so, why? I investigate these questions using a natural experiment in Switzerland. In the Middle Ages, the absence of an heir resulted in the extinction of a prominent noble dynasty. As a result, some Swiss municipalities became self-governing, whereas the others remained under feudalism for another 600 years. Evidence from a behavioral experiment, the World Values Survey and the Swiss Household Panel consistently show that individuals from historically self-governing municipalities exhibit stronger norms of cooperation today. Referenda data on voter-turnout allow me to trace these effects on individually costly and socially beneficial actions for over 150 years. Furthermore, norms of cooperation map into prosocial behaviors like charitable giving and environmental protection. Uniquely, Switzerland tracks every family's place of origin in registration data, which I use to demonstrate persistence from cultural transmission in a context of historically low migration.