Persuasion Meets Delegation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolotilin, Anton; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
• 署名单位: University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17051
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 195-228
• 关键词: Information disclosure; COMMUNICATION; monopolist; settings; DESIGN

摘要

A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single-crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion and linear delegation, implying their equivalence on the set of all stochastic mechanisms. Finally, using tools from the persuasion literature, we characterize optimal delegation mechanisms, thereby generalizing and extending existing results in the delegation literature.