The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ali, S. Nageeb; Mihm, Maximilian; Siga, Lucas
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22474
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 41-70
• 关键词: Information aggregation; polarization; uncertainty; BIAS; CONSEQUENCES; COMPETITION; MARKET

摘要

This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero-sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information. Our analysis identifies and interprets a form of adverse correlation that is necessary and sufficient for zero-sum thinking to prevail in equilibrium.