MARGINAL DETERRENCE IN ENFORCEMENT OF LAW

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: MOOKHERJEE, D; PNG, IPL
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/261963
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 1039-1066
• 关键词: OPTIMUM ENFORCEMENT; OPTIMAL MAGNITUDE; self-selection; fines; crime

摘要

We characterize optimal enforcement in a setting in which individuals can select among various levels of some activity, all of which are monitored at the same rate but may be prosecuted and punished at varying rates. For less harmful acts, marginal expected penalties ought to fall short of marginal harms caused. Indeed, some range of very minor acts should be legalized. For more harmful acts, whether marginal expected penalties should fall short of, or exceed, marginal harms depends on the balance between monitoring and prosecution/punishment costs. We also explore how the optimal enforcement policy varies with changes in these costs.