BEQUEST AS A PUBLIC GOOD WITHIN MARRIAGE - A NOTE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
ZHANG, J
署名单位：
Chinese University of Hong Kong
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-3808
DOI：
10.1086/261926
发表日期：
1994
页码：
187-193
关键词：
摘要：
Bequest to and marriage of children can lead to a Pareto-inefficient allocation. The inefficiency (or market failure) arises because one family, making a bequest to its own child, ignores the contribution to the utility of the other family whose child enters the marriage. This note shows that an assortative mating rule based on bequests can improve or even restore Pareto efficiency when parents take account of the rule in deciding the amount of bequests to their own children.
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