Districting and government overspending

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baqir, R
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/342804
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1318-1354
• 关键词: POLITICAL-PARTIES; budget deficits; fiscal-policy; pork barrel; institutions; rules; state

摘要

Theories of government spending driven by a common-pool problem in the fiscal revenues pool predict that greater districting of a political jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents evidence on this and related predictions from a cross section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that, when other plausible determinants of government spending are controlled for, greater districting leads to a considerably greater scale of government activity. The results also show that at-large electoral systems do not, and forms of government that concentrate powers in the office of the executive do, break this relationship.