Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cooley, T; Marimon, R; Quadrini, V
• 署名单位: New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; National Bureau of Economic Research; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/421170
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 817-847
• 关键词: information-technology revolution; moral hazard; equilibrium; RISK

摘要

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. This implies that economies with lower enforceability of contracts are characterized by greater macroeconomic volatility. A key assumption for the amplification result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.