Coordination and experimentation in M-form and U-form organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Qian, YY; Roland, G; Xu, CG
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/501170
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 366-402
• 关键词: reform; INFORMATION; KNOWLEDGE

摘要

We compare the performance of organizational forms (M-form and U-form) in experimenting with uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination in attribute matching but suffers from coordination in attribute compatibility and less gains in specialization. The distinctive advantage of the M-form is its flexibility in choosing between small-scale and full-scale experimentation.