Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fisman, Raymond; Miguel, Edward
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/527495
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1020-1048
• 关键词: crime; persistence; firm

摘要

We study cultural norms and legal enforcement in controlling corruption by analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan. Until 2002, diplomatic immunity protected UN diplomats from parking enforcement actions, so diplomats' actions were constrained by cultural norms alone. We find a strong effect of corruption norms: diplomats from high-corruption countries (on the basis of existing survey-based indices) accumulated significantly more unpaid parking violations. In 2002, enforcement authorities acquired the right to confiscate diplomatic license plates of violators. Unpaid violations dropped sharply in response. Cultural norms and (particularly in this context) legal enforcement are both important determinants of corruption.