The evolution of common law

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei
• 署名单位: Stockholm University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/511996
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 43-68
• 关键词: IDEOLOGY; COURTS

摘要

We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy-motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law's precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law.