The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goldstein, Markus; Udry, Christopher
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/595561
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 981-1022
• 关键词: PROPERTY-RIGHTS; economic-development; TENURE SYSTEMS; BURKINA-FASO; EFFICIENCY; incentives; household; REFORM

摘要

We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agriculture in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual corresponds to that individual's security of tenure over those specific plots and, in turn, to the individual's position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots.