Sources of advantageous selection: Evidence from the Medigap insurance market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fang, Hanming; Keane, Michael P.; Silverman, Dan
• 署名单位: University of Technology Sydney; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/587623
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 303-350
• 关键词: health plan choice; adverse selection; asymmetric information; moral hazard; BIASED SELECTION; medicare; MODEL; RISK; care; equilibrium

摘要

We provide evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance market and analyze its sources. Conditional on controls for Medigap prices, those with Medigap spend, on average, $4,000 less on medical care than those without. But if we condition on health, those with Medigap spend $2,000 more. The sources of this advantageous selection include income, education, longevity expectations, and financial planning horizons, as well as cognitive ability. Conditional on all these factors, those with higher expected medical expenditures are more likely to purchase Medigap. Risk preferences do.