Spatial competition with heterogeneous firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vogel, Jonathan
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/589891
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 423-466
• 关键词: equilibrium; EXISTENCE; STABILITY; entry; MODEL

摘要

I model endogenous horizontal and vertical product differentiation with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms. Firms are asymmetric in that they differ in their marginal costs. I prove that under an equilibrium refinement, all economically relevant firm outcomes are uniquely determined across all strict subgame perfect Nash equilibria. There are two central results. First, a firm's price, market share, and profit are independent of its neighbors' marginal costs, conditional on the average marginal cost in the market. Second, more productive firms are more isolated, all else equal. In particular, the distance between two firms is strictly decreasing in their average marginal cost.