Inefficient unemployment dynamics under asymmetric information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guerrieri, Veronica
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/591910
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 667-708
• 关键词: search; EFFICIENCY; models

摘要

I explore the efficiency properties of a competitive search model with match-specific private information and limited commitment on the workers' side. In a static setting the competitive search equilibrium is constrained efficient, whereas in a dynamic setting it is constrained inefficient whenever the initial unemployment rate is different from its steady-state level. Inefficiency arises because the workers' outside option becomes endogenous and affects the severity of the distortion due to the informational friction. This generates a novel externality: firms offering contracts at a given time do not internalize their effect on the outside option of workers hired in previous periods.