Efficiency of Simultaneous Search

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kircher, Philipp
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/644791
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 861-913
• 关键词: assignment; wage; INFORMATION; equilibria; MARKETS; game

摘要

This paper presents an equilibrium labor search model in which workers can simultaneously apply to multiple firms to increase their search intensity. They observe firms' wage postings before choosing where to apply. Owing to coordination frictions, a firm may not receive any applications; otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers. It is shown that the equilibrium converges to the efficient Walrasian outcome as application costs vanish. Even for nonnegligible application costs, the entry of firms, the search intensity, and the number of filled vacancies are constrained efficient. Wage dispersion is essential for constrained efficiency.