Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets on Hospital Performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Propper, Carol; Van Reenen, John
• 署名单位: Imperial College London; University of Bristol; University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/653137
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 222-273
• 关键词: competition; nhs; QUALITY; care; CONSEQUENCES; TECHNOLOGY; EMPLOYMENT; layoffs; improve; GROWTH

摘要

In many sectors, pay is regulated to be equal across heterogeneous geographical labor markets. When the competitive outside wage is higher than the regulated wage, there are likely to be falls in quality. We exploit panel data from the population of English hospitals in which regulated pay for nurses is essentially flat across the country. Higher outside wages significantly worsen hospital quality as measured by hospital deaths for emergency heart attacks. A 10 percent increase in the outside wage is associated with a 7 percent increase in death rates. Furthermore, the regulation increases aggregate death rates in the public health care system.