Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Nichifor, Alexandru; Ostrovsky, Michael; Westkamp, Alexander
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; University of Chicago; University of St Andrews; Stanford University; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/673402
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 966-1005
• 关键词: Substitutes

摘要

We introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts. We find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasi-linear, the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes for any underlying network structure. Furthermore, the set of stable outcomes is essentially equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria, and all stable outcomes are in the core and are efficient. By contrast, for any domain of preferences strictly larger than that of full substitutability, the existence of stable outcomes and competitive equilibria cannot be guaranteed.