Why Blame?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gurdal, Mehmet Y.; Miller, Joshua B.; Rustichini, Aldo
• 署名单位: Bogazici University; Bocconi University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/674409
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1205-1247
• 关键词: risk-aversion; Outcome bias; fairness; RECIPROCITY

摘要

We provide experimental evidence that subjects blame others on the basis of events they are not responsible for. In our experiment an agent chooses between a lottery and a safe asset; payment from the chosen option goes to a principal, who then decides how much to allocate between the agent and a third party. We observe widespread blame: regardless of their choice, agents are blamed by principals for the outcome of the lottery, an event they are not responsible for. We provide an explanation of this apparently irrational behavior with a delegated-expertise principal-agent model, the subjects' salient perturbation of the environment.