How Do Competitive Pressures Affect Incentives to Innovate When There Is a Market for Inventions?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Spulber, Daniel F.
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/674134
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1007-1054
• 关键词: research-and-development; free entry; monopolistic competition; DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY; industrial-structure; bertrand equilibria; Social efficiency; small firms; size; SCHUMPETER

摘要

Competition and intellectual property (IP) protections are complements in stimulating innovation. When IP is appropriable, a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate. Competition among producers, the demand side of the market for inventions, and competition among inventors, the supply side of the market for inventions, create incentives to innovate. When IP is not fully appropriable, markets for inventions are limited and competitive pressures can decrease incentives to innovate. Firms vertically integrate R&D and production and share technology to appropriate the returns to IP. This implies that antitrust policy and IP protections are complements.