Environmental Regulations and Corruption: Automobile Emissions in Mexico City

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oliva, Paulina
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/680936
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 686-724
• 关键词: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL; air-pollution; MOTOR-VEHICLES; Indonesia; errors; MARKET; COSTS

摘要

Emission regulations become more prevalent in developing countries, but they may be compromised by corruption. This paper documents the prevalence of corruption and the effectiveness of vehicle emission regulations in Mexico City. I develop a statistical test for identifying a specific type of cheating that involves bribing center technicians. I also estimate a structural model of car owner retesting and cheating decisions. Results suggest that 9.6 percent of car owners paid US$20 to circumvent the regulation. Eliminating cheating and increasing the cost of retests would reduce emissions by 3,708 tons at a high cost for vehicle owners.