Suspense and Surprise

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ely, Jeffrey; Frankel, Alexander; Kamenica, Emir
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/677350
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 215-260
• 关键词: Information disclosure; anticipatory feelings; BOUNDED MARTINGALE; MAXIMAL VARIATION; uncertainty; RESOLUTION; curiosity; MARKETS

摘要

We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period's beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period's belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise experienced by a Bayesian audience. We apply our results to the design of mystery novels, political primaries, casinos, game shows, auctions, and sports.