Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Behrman, Jere R.; Parker, Susan W.; Todd, Petra E.; Wolpin, Kenneth I.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Rice University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/675910
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 325-364
• 关键词: economics

摘要

This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentive schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment 1 provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment 2 to teachers only, and treatment 3 gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers, and school administrators. Program impact estimates reveal the largest average effects for treatment 3, smaller impacts for treatment 1, and no impact for treatment 2.