CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS AND STRATEGY - EXPERIMENTAL-DATA FROM SEQUENTIAL GAMES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: PRASNIKAR, V; ROTH, AE
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.2307/2118366
• 发表日期: 1992
• 页码: 865-888
• 关键词: noncooperative bargaining theory

摘要

Laboratory data from bargaining experiments have started a debate about the prospects for various parts of game theory as descriptive theories of observable behavior, and about whether, to what extent, and how a successful descriptive theory must take into account peoples' perceptions of fairness. Plausible explanations of the observed bargaining phenomena advanced by different investigators lead to markedly different predictions about what should be observed in three different games. A sharp experimental test is thus possible on this class of games, and the present paper reports the results of such a test.