CORRUPTION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
SHLEIFER, A; VISHNY, RW
署名单位：
University of Chicago
刊物名称：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0033-5533
DOI：
10.2307/2118402
发表日期：
1993
页码：
599-617
关键词：
摘要：
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.
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