Optimal Taxation and Human Capital Policies over the Life Cycle

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stantcheva, Stefanie
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/694291
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1931-1990
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; private information; income taxation; INEQUALITY; earnings; taxes

摘要

This paper derives optimal income tax and human capital policies in a life cycle model with risky human capital. The government faces asymmetric information regarding agents' ability, its evolution, and labor supply. When the wage elasticity with respect to ability is increasing in human capital, the optimal subsidy involves less than full deductibility of human capital expenses on the tax base and falls with age. Income contingent loans or a deferred deductibility scheme can implement the optimum. Numerical results suggest that full deductibility of expenses is close to optimal and that simple linear age -dependent policies perform very well.